This paper describes what could be labeled “best practices” in teaching ethics to those entering the criminal justice, criminology and related professional fields. The underlying focus of the discussion is on the “self” and reflects the beliefs of the authors in the pedagogic thesis that ethics awareness begins with individual social actors and their existing world views. Thereafter, self awareness of ethical dilemmas and internal safeguards against unethical behavior are defined by those same individuals. Lastly, the process continues when the (...) social actor gains an internalized, self-generated, accountability for one’s own actions. That self accountability may morph over time, depending on circumstances, but individual social actors remain effectively protected from unethical behavior as they master their own ethical challenges and live within their individualized sense of ethical purpose. To make these arguments the authors describe the background for an effective learning paradigm for the study of ethics that can be used in university level criminal justice courses, criminology classes, and police training sessions. This pedagogic approach is theoretically informed and used in classes designed to teach ethics to criminal justice professionals, criminology students who are entering a variety of professions. (shrink)

Paul Ricoeur was one of the foremost interpreters and translators of Edmund Husserl's philosophy. These nine essays present Ricoeur's interpretation of the most important of Husserl's writings, with emphasis on his philosophy of consciousness rather than his work in logic. In Ricoeur's philosophy, phenomenology and existentialism came of age and these essays provide an introduction to the Husserlian elements which most heavily influenced his own philosophical position.

In How We Get Along, philosopher David Velleman compares our social interactions to the interactions among improvisational actors on stage. He argues that we play ourselves - not artificially but authentically, by doing what would make sense coming from us as we really are. And, like improvisational actors, we deal with one another in dual capacities: both as characters within the social drama and as players contributing to the shared performance. In this conception of social intercourse, Velleman finds rational (...) grounds for morality, though not a rational guarantee. He maps a middle course between skepticism and rationalism, arguing that practical reasoning is 'pro-moral' without requiring moral action. The result is what he calls a 'Kinda Kantian metaethics'. How We Get Along is the summation of Velleman's thinking to date, incorporating and unifying previous work on agency, the self, the emotions, narrative and Kantian moral theory. (shrink)

In Foundations for Moral Relativism, J. David Velleman shows that different communities can indeed be subject to incompatible moralities, because their local mores are rationally binding. At the same time, he explains why the mores of different communities, even when incompatible, are still variations on the same moral themes. The book thus maps out a universe of many moral worlds without, as Velleman puts it, "moral black holes”. The five self-standing chapters discuss such diverse topics as online avatars and (...) virtual worlds, lying in Russian and truth-telling in Quechua, the pleasure of solitude and the fear of absurdity. Accessibly written, Foundations for Moral Relativism presupposes no prior training in philosophy. (shrink)

A comprehensive analysis of the theories of property developed by four key figures in classical German philosophy that explores such central questions as the nature of property, what specific forms of property are justifiable and whether property rights ought to be respected or limited in the name of freedom.

Self to Self brings together essays on personal identity, autonomy, and moral emotions by the distinguished philosopher J. David Velleman. Although each of the essays was written as an independent piece, they are unified by an overarching thesis, that there is no single entity denoted by 'the self', as well as by themes from Kantian ethics, psychoanalytic theory, social psychology, and Velleman's work in the philosophy of action. Two of the essays were selected by the editors of Philosophers' Annual (...) as being among the ten best papers in their year of publication. Aimed primarily at professional philosophers and advanced students, Self to Self will also be of interest to psychologists and others who theorize about the self. (shrink)

I argue that the freedom which is to coexist with the freedom of choice of others in accordance with a universal law mentioned in Kant's Rechtslehre is not itself freedom of choice. Rather, it is the independence which is a condition of being able to exercise genuine free choice by not having to act in accordance with the choices of others. Kant's distinction between active and passive citizenship appears, however, to undermine this idea of independence, because the possession of a (...) certain type of property right on the part of some citizens makes it possible for them to dominate others. Kant's account of property in this way turns out to be central to the question as to whether his Rechtslehre represents an internally consistent account of how freedom can be guaranteed within a legal and political community. I go on to argue that Kant's attempt to justify a pre-political right of property cannot be viewed as a successful justification of private property, and that he should have abandoned the notion of su... (shrink)

Taking a well-known passage from the third volume of Capital as my starting point, I explain on what grounds Marx thinks that freedom and necessity will be compatible in a communist society. The necessity in question concerns having to produce to satisfy material needs. Unlike some accounts of this issue, I argue that the compatibility of freedom and necessity in communist society has more to do with how production is organized than with the direct relation of the worker to the (...) object produced or to his or her own productive activity. Moreover, I show how self-realization and a form of activity that possesses an intrinsic value are made possible by the organization of the production process and how this is integral to Marx's account of the compatibility of freedom and necessity in communist society. (shrink)

The Addresses to the German Nation is one of Fichte's best-known works. It is also his most controversial work because of its nationalist elements. In this book, David James places this text and its nationalism within the context provided by Fichte's philosophical, educational and moral project of creating a community governed by pure practical reason, in which his own foundational philosophical science or Wissenschaftslehre could achieve general recognition. Rather than marking a break in Fichte's philosophy, the Addresses to (...) the German Nation and some lesser-known texts from the same period are shown to develop themes already present in his earlier writings. The themes discussed include the opposition between idealism and dogmatism, the role of Fichte's 'popular' lectures and writings in leading individuals to the standpoint of idealism, the view of history demanded by idealism and the role of the state in history. (shrink)

Fichte's definitions of property appear to diverge from modern common linguistic usage, especially his identification of leisure as the object of an absolute right of property, and they may even appear arbitrary. I argue that these definitions are not in fact arbitrary. Rather, any divergence from common linguistic usage can be explained in terms of a conceptual innovation which consists in expanding or modifying a concept by thinking it through, thereby generating new content. In the case of Fichte's theory of (...) property, this content turns out to be leisure as the primary object of a theory of distributive justice. The conceptual innovation found in Fichte's theory of property invites a reconceptualization of the relation between work and freedom. (shrink)

Hegel's Elements of the Philosophy of Right, one of the classic texts of German Idealism, is a seminal work of legal, social and political philosophy that has generated very different interpretations since its publication in 1821. Written with the advantage of historical distance, the essays in this volume adopt a fresh perspective that makes readers aware of the breadth and depth of this classic work. The themes of the essays reflect the continuing relevance of the text, and include Hegel's method, (...) the concept of property, Hegel's view of morality, the concept of Sittlichkeit, the modern family, the nature and tensions of civil society, and the question of the modernity of the Hegelian state. The volume will be of interest to all scholars and students of German Idealism and the history of political thought. (shrink)

In nine lively essays, bioethicist J. David Velleman challenges the prevailing consensus about assisted suicide and reproductive technology, articulating an original approach to the ethics of creating and ending human lives. He argues that assistance in dying is appropriate only at the point where talk of suicide is not, and he raises moral objections to anonymous donor conception. In their place, Velleman champions a morality of valuing personhood over happiness in making end-of-life decisions, and respecting the personhood of future (...) children in making decisions about procreation. These controversial views are defended with philosophical rigor while remaining accessible to the general reader. Written over Velleman's 30 years of undergraduate teaching in bioethics, the essays have never before been collected and made available to a non-academic audience. They will open new lines of debate on issues of intense public interest."--Publisher's website. (shrink)

In this study of Fichte's social and political philosophy, David James offers an interpretation of Fichte's most famous writings in this area, including his Foundations of Natural Right and Addresses to the German Nation, centred on two main themes: property and virtue. These themes provide the basis for a discussion of such issues as what it means to guarantee the freedom of all the citizens of a state, the problem of unequal relations of economic dependence between states, and (...) the differences and connections between the legal and political sphere of right and morality. James also relates Fichte's central social and political ideas to those of other important figures in the history of philosophy, including Locke, Kant and Hegel, as well as to the radical phase of the French Revolution. His account will be of importance to all who are interested in Fichte's philosophy and its intellectual and political context. (shrink)

The claim that Rousseau's writings influenced the development of Kant's critical philosophy, and German idealism, is not a new one. As correct as the claim may be, it does not amount to a systematic account of Rousseau's place within this philosophical tradition. It also suggests a progression whereby Rousseau's achievements are eventually eclipsed by those of Kant, Fichte and Hegel, especially with respect to the idea of freedom. In this book David James shows that Rousseau presents certain challenges (...) that Kant and the idealists Fichte and Hegel could not fully meet, by making dependence and necessity, as well as freedom, his central concerns, and thereby raises the question of whether freedom in all its forms is genuinely possible in a condition of human interdependence marked by material inequality. His study will be valuable for all those studying Kant, German idealism and the history of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century ideas. (shrink)

By means of careful analysis of relevant writings by Hobbes, Rousseau, Kant, Hegel, and Marx, David James argues that the concept of practical necessity is key to understanding the nature and extent of human freedom. Practical necessity means being, or believing oneself to be, constrained to perform certain actions in the absence of other, more attractive options, or by the high costs involved in pursuing other options. Agents become subject to practical necessity as a result of economic, social, (...) and historical forces over which they have, or appear to have, no effective control, and the extent to which they are subject to it varies according to the amount of economic and social power that one agent possesses relative to other agents. The concept of practical necessity is also shown to take into account how the beliefs and attitudes of social agents are in large part determined by social and historical processes in which they are caught up, and that the type of motivation that we attribute to agents must recognize this. Practical Necessity, Freedom, and History: From Hobbes to Marx shows how Rousseau, Kant, Hegel, and Marx, in contrast to Hobbes, explain the emergence of the conditions of a free society in terms of a historical process that is initially governed by practical necessity. The role that this form of necessity plays in explaining history necessity invites the following question: to what extent are historical agents genuinely subject to both practical and historical necessity? (shrink)

The possibility of achieving ectogenesis, or the growing of a human fetus to term in an artificial womb, is approaching reality as a result of advances in treatment of premature newborns and in in vitro fertilization techniques. In their 1984 book, The Reproductive Revolution, issued in North America as Making Babies, Peter Singer and Deane Wells offered several arguments for ectogenesis. James examines their arguments and rejects two of them, that ectogenesis offers a less problematic alternative to surrogate motherhood, (...) and that ectogenesis could make it possible to reconcile fetal rights with the right to abortion on demand. He grants Singer and Wells' argument that the childless have a claim to state support of their desire to nurture, but contends that government-supported ectogenesis should still be rejected because the adoption of unwanted children is a preferable alternative to the use of an exotic, expensive, and still unproven technology. (shrink)

Abstract Carl Schmitt distinguishes between political theories in terms of whether they rest on the anthropological assumption that man is evil by nature or on the anthropological assumption that man is good by nature, and he claims that liberal political theory is based on the latter assumption. Contrary to this claim, I show how Kant's liberalism is shaped by his theory of the radical evil in human nature, and that his liberalism corresponds to the characterization of liberalism that Schmitt himself (...) offers. My discussion of this issue will be shown to have certain implications with respect to the view that for Kant evil is the product of society. I show that this view is mistaken insofar as it fails to recognize that Kant's political philosophy implies that human beings require the type of society that best suits their radically evil natures, namely, a commercial one in which the ?vices of culture? largely have free play, while the state's role is limited to that of preventing the antagonisms found in society leading to the mutual destruction of its members. (shrink)

I argue that two aims can be detected in Fichte’s theory of punishment: a technical aim that concerns adopting the appropriate means of punishing the criminal with a view to ensuring public securit...

It is claimed that Hegel denies the possibility of a modern epic and that his lectures on aesthetics demand the condemnation of all the art of his own time. I use the available student transcripts of his lectures on aesthetics, in conjunction with Lukács's views on the novel, to show that Hegel suggests that the novel might count as a modern epic and that it may perform a significant function in modern ethical life (Sittlichkeit) as presented in his own philosophy (...) of right. While Hegel raises questions concerning the possibility of a modern epic, he also presents the novel with a task that Lukács's interpretation of Balzac's Illusions perdues shows the novel is able to fulfill. This becomes evident when we consider Hegel's remarks on the novel in connection with his theory of civil society. (shrink)

Both Hegel and Marx appear committed to the idea that the Reign of Terror was in some sense necessary. I argue that Hegel explains this necessity in terms of the concept of ‘absolute freedom’, together with the associated self-conception and normative picture of the world. It will be argued that Marx also views the Reign of Terror as necessary because of an abstract conception of political freedom and the citizen which conflicts with a determinate individuality that is characterized by particular (...) interests and identities. In connection with Marx’s critique of Hegel’s theory of the modern state I draw attention to a puzzle, the discussion of which will lead to a brief account of how Marx’s attempt to overcome the opposition between the state and civil society differs from Hegel’s. (shrink)

Late German Idealism: Trendelenburg and Lotze, by BeiserFrederick. Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2013.

_ Source: _Page Count 25 I explore the role of practical necessity in Kant’s essay _Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Aim_. This form of necessity arises on the basis of social and interstate antagonism and Kant appeals to it with the aim of avoiding the introduction of a standpoint that is external to the agents whose attitudes and actions are being described. In connection with the role that Kant accords to practical necessity in the establishment of the (...) legal and political conditions required to fulfil the ‘plan of nature’ in the course of history, I argue that in this essay he fails to identify a mechanism that would explain a fundamental moral change in that which motivates human beings once these conditions have been established. This in turn invites questions concerning the kind of universal history that Kant proposes. In particular, I argue that the choice of historical material that it demands could, in certain circumstances, be regarded as counterpurposive in relation to the aim of nature of which Kant speaks in the same essay. (shrink)

: I explore Rousseau's account of the problem of dependence by means of an analysis of the distinction he makes between dependence on things and dependence on men. With reference to his Second Discourse, I argue that dependence on things alone exists only in the case of primitive man in the earliest stages of the state of nature, while dependence on men is more properly to be understood as dependence on other human beings as mediated by dependence on things. I (...) go on to argue that in the light of Rousseau's account of dependence and his description in the Second Discourse of a spontaneous dependence and inequality generating process, there is a significant problem with his solution to the problem of dependence on other human beings proposed in the Social Contract. This problem can be understood in terms of the relation of the idea of will to that of necessity, and I suggest that Rousseau was himself aware of it. (shrink)

Rousseau has been cast as someone who is primarily interested in developing a normative social and political philosophy based on the idea of a non-inflamed form of amour-propre, which consists in a desire for equal, as opposed to superior, social standing. On this basis it has been argued that inflamed amour-propre is the principal source of social inequality in his Second Discourse and that the normative aspects of this text can be largely isolated from its descriptive ones. I argue against (...) both claims by showing that the desire for independence provides an alternative principal source of social inequality, and that the Second Discourse points the way to a genuine critical theory precisely because it describes in narrative form dynamic, concrete social processes in such a way as to challenge the claims of ideal social and political theory, including attempts to interpret the Second Discourse itself primarily in terms of an independent normative social and political philosophy. (shrink)

Although Herder is critical of the Enlightenment, I show that his philosophy of history commits him to the claim that the age and culture shaped by the Enlightenment in some way makes a distinctive contribution to the development of humanity. Yet this contribution cannot make this age and culture superior to earlier ones, for this would violate Herder’s commitment to the principle that each age and culture ought to be accorded an equal status because of the equal value of its (...) contribution to the full development of humanity. I argue that an abstract way of thinking and a hostility to prejudice are integral elements of Herder’s attempt to situate the Enlightenment in his philosophy of history, despite how he otherwise criticizes the Enlightenment for its abstract thinking and its hostility to prejudice. (shrink)

The Possibility of Practical Reason explores the foundational questions of moral psychology: How can any of our behavior qualify as acting for a reason? How can any considerations qualify as reasons for us to act? David Velleman argues that both possibilities depend on there being a constitutive aim of action―something that makes for success in action as such. These twelve essays―five of which were not included in the previous edition, two of them previously unpublished―discuss topics such as freedom of (...) the will, shared intention, the relation between value and practical reasoning, the foundations of decision theory, and the motivational role of the imagination. (shrink)

This paper is a comprehensive examination of the ethical issues surrounding artificial insemination. The interests of parents, AI children and society are identified and compared, and a variety of arguments for and against AIH and AID are examined. Although various criticisms of the natural law position are offered, this paper comes to the similar conclusion that donor artiricial insemination is not morally justified.

In his early Some Lectures concerning the Scholar’s Vocation, J. G. Fichte developed an account of the social role of the scholar. This role concerns the task of furthering human culture and progress, which Fichte considers to be a moral duty for the scholar. In these lectures, Fichte also outlined the capabilities and knowledge that the scholar needs in order to be able to fulfill the task in question, including the possession of historical knowledge. The article argues that the later (...) Addresses to the German Nation represent an attempt on Fichte’s part to realize his earlier conception of the scholar’s vocation, because these addresses aim to help usher in a new, superior epoch in human history. Particular attention is paid to the use that Fichte makes of history in them. In effect, he instrumentalizes history, and justifies his doing this in terms of a higher purpose and the ‘merely’ empirical status of historical fact and evidence. This use of history is compared to some things that Nietzsche has to say about history in his essay On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life; and it invites questions concerning the possible dangers of such a use of history and its compatibility with Fichte’s idea that the vocation of the scholar is a moral one. (shrink)

I offer an interpretation of Hegel's account of the essential differences between the original epic and the modern epic which supports two claims that have been made on the basis of the available student transcripts of Hegel's lectures on the philosophy of art: Hegel never asserted that art had come to an end in the sense of its having no further significance or interest in the modern world; and Hegel was keen to understand art as a cultural and historical phenomenon, (...) with the result that he came to limit the significance of art in the modern world on account of its no longer being able to perform the same historical function that it performed in the ancient world. While I seek to illustrate these two points through my interpretation of Hegel's account of the original epic and his remarks on the modern epic, I also argue that, given certain other aspects of his thought, Hegel could have accorded the modern epic a greater potential than he does; moreover, I argue that this suggests a greater continuity between the original epic and its modern day counterpart than Hegel himself appears to allow. (shrink)

I discuss J. G. Fichte’s theory of property and its implications in relation to the claim made by C. B. Macpherson that, by broadening the meaning of the term ‘property’, it becomes possible to reconcile two principles of liberal democratic theory that seem to be at odds with each other: the right to property, understood as the right to exclude others from the use or benefit of something, and the right to use and develop one’s capacities. I argue that Fichte’s (...) broad conception of property can be viewed as an example of how this might be done. I also show, however, that Fichte demonstrates that a political reconciliation of these rights is demanded by the conceptual reconciliation of them, and that such political reconciliation may demand placing considerable limitations, in the form of state regulation and the redistribution of resources, on human freedom. (shrink)

I compare Kant's position on the issue as to whether there exists a right of rebellion with the position that can be attributed to Hegel on this issue. I argue that while Kant must concede that such a right exists when the state no longer respects what he calls the universal law of right. Hegel offers us grounds for thinking that a right of rebellion may exist even when the state has achieved the form of a Kantian Rechtstaat. I appeal (...) to Hegel's understanding of right as the concrete expression of the general will and his account of poverty in order to establish this conclusion. (shrink)

The author argues for the significance of the critique of Rousseau found in Fichte’s early series of lectures on the vocation of the scholar by showing how his presentation of his foundational philosophical science, the Wissenschaftslehre, was in large part shaped by the wish to meet certain challenges posed by Rousseau’s Discourse on the Sciences and the Arts. These challenges concern Rousseau’s claim that the sciences have their source in pride and his claim that they are incompatible with virtue. Fichte’s (...) portrayal of the dispute between idealism and dogmatism and his claim that the Wissenschaftslehre presupposes the existence of a kind of virtue represent responses to these particular challenges. The author also explores the implications of Fichte’s attempt to meet these challenges for his account of the “republic of scholars.”. (shrink)

Given its use of religious concepts and language, it is tempting to class Fichte’s rarely discussed Staatslehre as a political theology. I argue that the Staatslehre can be classed as a political theology because of the way in which it can be understood in terms of the concepts of immanence and transcendence. The concept of immanence applies to Fichte’s account of history in particular. Fichte himself allows for a moment of transcendence at the very beginning of history. I argue that (...) the concept of transcendence is also implicit in the Staatslehre in relation to some problems faced by Fichte’s own account of the role of the Zwingherr in the historical development and actualization of right and moral freedom, despite his attempt to avoid introducing theologically based explanations of political concepts at this stage of his Staatslehre. (shrink)

(2008). The significance of kierkegaard's interpretation of Don Giovanni in relation to Hegel's philosophy of art1. British Journal for the History of Philosophy: Vol. 16, No. 1, pp. 147-162.